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ABSTRACT 
In the Wrong: Bad Poems and Errant Teaching in Anne Carson's Men in the Off 
Hours 
Simon Reader 
This thesis considers the aesthetic and pedagogical potential of error as it 
emerges in the poetry and criticism of Anne Carson. At stake is error's status as a 
viable alternative to irony, which I argue is an ethically problematic stance employed 
both in literary practice and the classroom. Carson's obsession with mistakes makes 
available a mode of engagement with texts and students that refuses the cool distance 
of ironic detachment. Irony is a dialectical strategy that allows speakers not to commit 
to critical stances or emotional positions. It puts readers and students on their guard. 
Invoking error, on the other hand, allows us to discuss a wider range of cognitive, 
ethical, and emotional events in which we commit or invest in ways generally 
considered wrong. This thesis has two chapters. The first argues that Carson's poetry 
engages such phenomena as impersonation, mistranslation, and catachresis in order to 
stage a poetics of error. The second moves from rhetorical to relational concerns, 
foregrounding Carson's status as a professor of the humanities in order to draw out 
the pedagogical consequences spurred by her poetics. 
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Carson: " O f f is a big word. I like the word off. ..the "of f part was a way of thinking about 
time and the places where time bends that it is not quite infinite but at an angle to 
the ordinary, where people do some of their best thinking [sic\. 
Interviewer: Off hours? 
Carson: Yes and off mind. If you can get off your mind at an angle — you'll notice this in 
teaching, that when students are suddenly a litde displaced from what they thought 
they thought, they begin to actually think. But that angle is hard to get to. 
(Carson "In Conversation with Anne Carson" 4) 
This thesis is about error, impersonation, and pedagogy in Anne Carson's poetry. 
Specifically, it seeks to account for the way in which Carson's aesthetic and rhetorical 
engagements make available a model of pedagogical relationality that distinguishes itself 
from the cool distance of Socratic irony as it is often construed today. "Irony is Not 
Enough," she declares in the title of a piece from Men in the Off Hours. What is the 
nature of its insufficiency? What alternative models does Carson's work afford? The two 
chapters of this thesis respectively consider the question from two vantage points: the 
rhetorical and aesthetic, on the one hand, and the relational and pedagogical, on the other. 
Socratic irony is a stance adopted deliberately for dialectical purposes. It is an "intended 
simulation., .used to challenge received knowledge and wisdom" (Colebrook 2-7), a 
complex way of both meaning and not meaning what one says simultaneously in order to 
covertly manipulate a pedagogical encounter (Vlastos 42). Irony involves masking, 
dissimulation, and calculation at a cool remove from what one says or writes. 
Both sections of my thesis argue that Carson contributes a subtle but far-reaching 
complication to classical ironic norms that allows her to engage a richer field of 
cognitive, ethical, and emotional events. The adjustment involves focusing on error 
Reader 2 
rather than irony, a move that shifts discussion of Carson's work away from 
dissimulation and rhetorical controls and towards experiment, accident, improvisation 
and impulse, terms which are much more relevant in a consideration of her project. In the 
quotation above Carson suggests one aspect of the distinction when she says she wants to 
focus on moments "not quite infinite but at an angle to the ordinary." Irrelevant, then, is 
the "absolute infinite negativity" of irony that captured the attention of Hegel and 
Kierkegaard. Carson wants to distort the ordinary, which I will argue is a very different 
thing. While many critics have focused on the critical-aesthetic collisions in Carson's 
intergeneric productions, to my knowledge this thesis represents the first attempt to 
discuss the specifically pedagogical consequences that issue from such encounters. 
In most cases we would think of error as something to be avoided, at the most an 
event to be tolerated for teaching us what not to do. In terms of aesthetics, however, it 
may assume a different kind of value. In Plato's Republic, the famous assertion holds that 
imitation should be regarded as an error because it involves creating objects at two 
removes from ideal forms. The further down the line one gets from the forms, the greater 
the margin for error. Such mistakenness is counterproductive and therefore undesirable, 
even dangerous. Aristotle, at least by Carson's account, also describes imitation and 
metaphor as kinds of errors in both the Poetics and the Rhetoric, but stops short at calling 
for the evasion of such mistakes. At stake for Aristotle is the affect of surprise, catalyzed 
by an impression of the new. Carson narrates his position in "Essay on What I Think 
About Most": 
In what does the freshness of metaphor consist? 
Aristotle says that metaphor causes the mind to experience itself 
in the act of making a mistake. 
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Imitation {mimesis in Greek) 
is Aristotle's collective term for the true mistakes of poetry. 
What I like about this term 
is the ease with which it accepts 
that what we are engaged in when we do poetry is error, 
the willful creation of error, 
the deliberate break and complication of mistakes 
out of which may arise 
unexpectedness. (Men 30-35) 
Error and poetry, by this account, both share a structure of defamiliarization. Errors are 
committed, we do them, just as we do poetry, and both jolt us away from the ordinary 
surface of life into fresh trajectories previously unthought. The lyric "I" at the centre of 
the passage tells us what it likes, and a statement of preference could not be more 
appropriate here, where the value of error and poetry is decidedly affective. W.K. 
Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley also observed the erroneous structure of metaphor in 
their essay "The Affective Fallacy": 
The vivid realization of metaphor comes from its being in some way an 
obstruction to practical knowledge (like a torn coat sleeve to the act of dressing). 
Metaphor operates by being abnormal or inept, the wrong way of saying 
something. (36) 
So while in the Republic mimesis is simply a cognitive error, a failure to obtain the truth, 
Aristotle's Rhetoric detects within error a genetic, affective function. The failure of error 
becomes a failure to conform to the strictures of habit. 
Irony becomes a strategy to avoid error, or a means of escaping the shame and 
humiliation that the appearance of error tends to attract. It is a dialectical performance 
that determines in advance of its appearance which interlocutors will be included and 
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which excluded from the speaker's community. It is at worst a radically skeptical 
position, one that protects its user from entering into any commitment or reciprocal 
relationship with other agents and forecloses on the possibility of what Aristotle calls the 
"new and fresh." Error forsakes irony's insularity and elitism to risk the possibility of the 
new. Rather than creating a rift between what I say and what I mean, error (that is, the 
risking of error and even, as Carson puts it above, the "willful creation of error") involves 
impersonation, a way of invoicing statements and opinions not my own yet not not my 
own. Wimsatt and Beardsley's image of the torn coat sleeve serves to illustrate the 
creation of new adjustments or dispositions out of unexpected and impractical 
circumstances. 
Ever since she wrote Eros the Bittersweet, Anne Carson has been thrillingly 
obsessed with such risks. In that volume she narrates the ancient Greek conception of 
desire as an extreme example of a mistake, as an "invasion, an illness, an insanity, a wild 
animal, a natural disaster" (148). "How do apparently external events enter and take 
control of one's psyche?" is the question that Carson watches the poets and philosophers 
struggle to answer in Eros the Bittersweet. Eros forces humans into new dispositions, 
new attitudes, new selves. "Change is risk," she writes. "What makes the risk 
worthwhile?" (159) Desire feels wrong; it assaults the body and the mind as though they 
were one and the same thing. The verse and prose experiments that have followed that 
initial onrush all continue the preoccupation with error and its synonyms. Once she frees 
herself from "fear, anxiety, shame, remorse / and all the other silly emotions associated 
with making mistakes," Carson is able to try her hand at kinds of writing that from an 
academic perspective remain as wrong as can be. Glass, Irony and God presents a writer 
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straying from critical norms to emphasize self-reference and subjectivity, using the 
seduction of her personal life to engender an attention in her reader that slips from text to 
author, confusing and distorting both in the process. In Plainwater, an errant pilgrim on 
the road to Compostela or roving through American campgrounds records diffuse 
personal and philosophical impressions in her black notebooks. Autobiography of Red 
presents a poetic fictionalization of the fragments of Stesichoros, creating a queer 
monster out of the shredded poems: Geryon, a red, winged artist who grapples with the 
sensation of being born into a mistake. 
So why choose Men in the Off Hours as the principle text for this thesis? In many 
ways it is the most "off' of any of Carson's works. There are no erudite, sixty-page 
essays in verse or prose. Instead, dozens of short, apparently unedited lyrics announce 
themselves as drafts or fragments. The book moves at an opaque speed through what 
seem like sloppy odds and ends, incipient moments of attention directed at an eclectic 
group of artists and their characters: Woolf, Antigone, Artaud, Edward Hopper, Tolstoy, 
Catherine Deneuve, to name a few. "Like a cut-and-paste collage of heads from Vogue 
and bodies from Time," one reviewer describes it. The book reads like a series of rapid 
improvisations by a poetic impersonator who refuses to settle on any one figure or style 
for too long or in too much depth before she turns the page and distorts the conditions of 
her writing anew. In this sense the collection represents an extended series, rather than 
Carson's preferred mode of the long poem. I think that Men in the Off Hours can act as a 
lens for Carson's entire prolific output. Notoriously, many of the poems in the book are 
said to fail—some enact a "freeze-dried surrealism," says one critic, citing "Epitaph: 
Europe" as his example: 
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Once live X-rays stalked the hills as if they were 
Trees. Bones stay now 
And their Lent says with them, black on the nail. 
Tattering on the daywall. 
I admit to being inspired by the positive and negative judgments of value that Carson 
seems to attract from critics, other poets, and classicists. Partially, this is due to an urge to 
praise and defend the work of a poet who has had such an impact on my life, but it also 
represents a more disinterested interest in Carson's status as a humanist. Over the course 
of her academic career the humanities have been disturbed by the question of their own 
value, in many ways even alienated from any sense of their own value. This alienation 
acts as fodder for Carson's project. Unsatisfied with taking up a merely ironic stance 
toward the canon, she uses it to defamiliarize her own sense of what a self can be, as what 
Charles Altieri in Canons and Consequences has called a collection of permissions rather 
than exclusions. 
The most famous attack on Carson's own poetic value forms the basis of my first 
chapter. David Solway believes that Anne Carson is nothing more than a media-
supported construct who superficially embodies the public's sense of "poetry." I argue 
that Solway's accusations find an historical (indeed, a classical) equivalent in the 
arguments Socrates makes against the profession of the rhapsode in the Ion. Rhapsodes 
fulfilled a public role in reciting and transmitting the aesthetic intensities of other poets, 
in particular Homer. Socrates accuses Ion of not accomplishing anything real or concrete, 
of being a sham. Yet do the rhapsodes not play a distinctive social role in impersonating 
and embodying the mentalities and dispositions that other poets present to them? Do they 
not consolidate the community of their audience by acting as a focal point or transmitter 
of possible dispositions, allowing us to see how different roles are imbricated in 
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permanent flux? Isn't this kind of attention valuable, even as it strays from critical 
judgment into the byways of error, forsaking the ethics of self-control for immediacy, 
impulse, and improvisation? Impersonation, therefore, raises the problem of 
responsibility. It creates a dilemma for those who would prefer to see people as 
individual, clearly defined entities that can adopt or discard other personae for rhetorical 
effect at will. The first chapter considers these questions by examining the rhetorical 
possibilities that Carson's poetry makes available through a reading of poems that exhibit 
the tropes of impersonation, mistranslation, and catachresis. 
The second chapter shifts the discussion from rhetoric to relationality, attempting 
to articulate the specifically pedagogical consequences that follow from Anne Carson's 
aesthetics of error. It is preoccupied with a conflict between impersonation and Socratic 
irony as it is narrated in two versions of the poem "Irony is Not Enough: Essay on My 
Life as Catherine Deneuve." The overlap of different roles is imminent here: Carson 
impersonates Deneuve as she narrates a graduate seminar on Sappho, during which she 
apparently falls in love with one of her female students. Different trajectories for the 
relationship are all suggested and tangled up with each other: there is the Socratic-ironic 
relation, the Sapphic-erotic relation, and the cinematic relation energized by Deneuve's 
presence at the centre of the action. At stake in this chapter are two competing narratives 
of what it means to teach: one ironically fabricates wrong positions as a means to force 
students into independent thought, eventually leading to the stabilization of categorical 
truth; the other sees the teacher-student relation a play of surfaces, a distracted and 
permanently roundabout sequence of impersonations taken on to continually 
defamiliarize and readjust the terms or texts under discussion. The second approach 
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aestheticizes the pedagogical relationship in order to provoke vital acts of attention from 
the student. Both accounts involve a student focusing on the personality and body of the 
teacher as well as the material taught, but while the Socratic method sees this kind of 
attention as a problem, the Carsonian method sees it as a reality of education worthy of 
consideration and cultivation. Two films about women and aesthetic education, The 
Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1969) and Notes on a Scandal (2006), serve to articulate the 
anxieties that our culture still feels toward this aspect of pedagogy. 
Attending to error, even encouraging it, is a subversive and counterintuitive 
pedagogical stance, one that imitates an aesthetic attitude with a degree of quixotic 
impertinence. While Carson seems to crop up as something of an "irritant" within the 
academic community, I think that in the end her performance contains as much potential 
for academics as it does for poets, in showing what is possible when we allow ourselves 
to engage the error of an aestheticized education that takes affective positions and 
benefits as its point of departure and involves ideological critique only insofar as it assists 
aesthetic experience. This does not mean viewing art and experience as a pleasure-hunt; 
what it involves is emphasizing the aesthetics of education itself as a means of sustaining 
humanist interest. The canon can and should remain, flexible and evolving as it is. Carson 
is in the business of conserving interest in it by making it strange. "You don't learn 
anything when you're still up on the window ledge, safe. [You] jump from what you 




ERROR IN ANNE CARSON'S POETRY 
"The trick of judging the whole by the detail, instead of the other way about, of mistaking 
the means for the end, the technique for the value, is in fact much the most successful of the 
snares which waylay the critic.. .We pay attention to externals when we do not know what 
else to do with a poem" 
I. A. Richards, Principles of Literary Criticism 
This chapter presents a study of aesthetic and critical errors in the poetry of Anne 
Carson. At stake is error's status as a productive alternative to what I see as the 
problematic operations of irony, understood as an aesthetic, rhetorical, and ethical 
strategy. Given what Claire Colebrook calls irony's "unwieldy complexity," it would be 
worthwhile from the outset to clarify how the term will be employed, in order to make 
clear the identity of the defendant and the context of the charges laid (Colebrook 1). 
Carson's classicism, her career as a scholar of ancient Greek literature, makes 
Socratic irony the obvious context in which to begin the discussion. The central notion I 
argue against, while attached to the tropic sense of irony (saying the opposite of what is 
meant), is also deeply concerned with the Romantic elaboration of Socratic irony as a 
whole way of life. Specifically, I address the conception of irony defined in the writing of 
Hegel and Kierkegaard as "absolute infinite negativity" or "infinite elasticity." Freedom, 
for Kierkegaard in The Concept of Irony, involves detachment from what one says, 
isolation from one's community and a bifurcated relation with oneself: 
If I am conscious when I speak that what I say is my meaning, and that what is 
said is an adequate expression for my meaning, and I assume that the person with 
whom I am speaking comprehends perfectly the meaning in what is said, then I 
am bound by what is said, that is, I am here positively free.. .Furthermore, I am 
bound in relation to myself and cannot detach myself whenever I choose. If, on 
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the other hand, what is said is not my meaning, or the opposite of my meaning, 
then I am free both in relation to others and in relation to myself. (Kierkegaard 
264-5) 
Irony involves distance and a self-affirming mechanism designed to ensure a subject's 
unique and undefiled protection from the located statements and the "ordinary pedestrian 
speech" of the world (265). It involves height, a relief from the mundane. It "looks down 
from its exalted station," in Kierkegaard's words, on the ordinary. In this sense, it would 
seem to be the quintessential stance for the critic, for irony supposedly guarantees 
superior, and necessarily negative, reflection on the acts and statements that place people 
in the world. It also suits a particular vision of the artist, who would playfully engage 
myriad speakers or ways of seeing without sincerely committing to any of them. As such, 
irony has earned a reputation for solidifying elitist sensibilities1. My argument is that 
Anne Carson exploits and seizes the potential in aesthetic and critical error in such a way 
that highlights the unsatisfying and ethically problematic operations of irony, making 
available an attitude toward art and academic practice more concerned with the real 
effects of inspiration and impersonation. 
This chapter has three parts, each of which presents Carson employing a different 
kind of aesthetic, rhetorical, or critical error, in each case foregrounding the insufficiency 
of irony to account for particular modes of literary and critical practice. The first part 
engages a recent polemic in the history of Canadian poetics, the infamous attack on 
1
 Linda Hutcheon, of course, argues that irony is transideological, that "nothing is ever 
guaranteed at the politicized scene of irony" (15). While I agree with Hutcheon when she 
says that irony may be employed for any political position or cause, and that irony 
engages the emotions as much as the intellect, I believe irony's ethics are less unstable 
than its politics, and that there is always something dubious about presuming to adopt a 
position while always allowing oneself an escape hatch. 
Reader 11 
Carson's work by the Montreal poet and critic David Solway. I argue for the critical 
possibility of attached modes of reading and writing about texts, after showing that 
Solway's criticism relies on a division between Socratic irony and rhapsodic passion first 
developed in the Platonic dialogue Ion, a division that became important for New Critics 
such as W.K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks in defining the proper role of the critic in a 
formalist context; Solway, as we shall see, replicates this division in his recent arguments 
against the value of Carson's works (Wimsatt and Brooks 3-20). 
Impersonation and inspiration are the keywords of this chapter, and Men in the 
Off Hours is its central text. Many of the shorter lyrics in Men in the Off Hours are less 
concerned with manipulating distances and parodying different personae at a remove and 
for rhetorical effect than with developing a different kind of engagement. This mode 
involves the impersonation of figures and texts in such a way that permits and encourages 
the overlap of intensities and affective states between author, speaker and the personae 
that make up the poems' subjects. The heights of irony are replaced with intensities of 
arousal and inspiration, with an immersion in personae that precedes the decision about 
what attitude to adopt toward them, the way a brush is suspended in a pool of paint. 
The second section focuses on the errors of mistranslation as they are theorized in 
a series of poems on Antonin Artaud and deployed in Carson's botched translations of 
Catullus. The inevitable errors that superintend the predicament of the translator become 
in themselves a source of poetic potential, and allow us to develop a positive view of 
aesthetic error that prefers the unfinished, improvised, even the frankly bad poem to the 
polished, dexterous, and refined work. How do such aesthetic errors function positively? 
Carson has at various times read and relied upon Aristotle's theory of poetry as a 
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celebration of error: "It was not surprising to Aristotle that poets make mistakes, nor that 
they enjoy it, nor that such errors can sometimes be more true than correct information" 
("Just for the Thrill" 151). The aesthetic error of mistranslation offers a different kind of 
information than that contained in more proper, accurate translations. By focusing 
intensely on what is lost in translation, Carson actually shows what can be gained: fresh, 
immediate collisions that give rise to the unexpected, to the new. More akin to an 
impersonation, the mistranslated poem means to record the affective responses to both 
the original poem and the process of rendering it visible in another language. "A 
translator is someone trying to get in between a body and its shadow," Carson wrote, 
describing translation as an interception and so drawing attention to the way in which it 
imbricates different bodies, personalities, and qualities. "Shadows fall and move," she 
says ("Translator's Forward" 41). 
Section three elaborates on these goals, articulating the value of the unfinished 
and the bad, but through an analysis of the infamously "bad" trope of catachresis ("wrong 
usage": an unearned, imprecise, hubristic figure) as it surfaces in the poem/bad 
translation "First Chaldaic Oracle" and informs Carson's work as a whole. As Robert 
Stanton has asked in his essay on Carson's errancy, "does the impertinence of metaphor 
lie, then, not in a poet's specific uses of it, but in its very essence" (32)? Catachresis may 
not be the "essence" of metaphor, but it does represent metaphor at its most irritating and 
unusual, often caught in the most vivid errors. 
IMPERSONATION 
Carson has always had a somewhat vexed relationship with both rigorous 
classicists and other poets. Is she in fact a bad critic? A bad poet? Consider the following 
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poetic fragment of the poet Alkman, a piece that resurfaces again and again in her work, 
always as a performance of the aesthetic and intellectual potential of error. In Men in the 
Off Hours, for example, it is the central text in "Essay on What I Think about Most," a 
poem-essay that addresses the possibility of taking metaphor and mimesis as kinds of 
error: 
[?] made three seasons, summer 
and winter and autumn third 
and fourth spring when 
there is blooming but to eat enough 
is not. (32) 
Carson goes on to describe her enjoyment of this poem that depends on a "computational 
mistake" whereby a fourth season (spring) appends itself to what was just declared to be 
a sequence of three. In a critical move forbidden to professional classicists, Carson 
chooses to read the fragment as though it were a whole poem, for this allows her to let an 
absence ([?]) stand in for what was more likely a deity from archaic Greece. What is 
important to note is the way in which Carson responds to "an accident of transmission" 
with an act of wrong or shoddy critical reading, as though the object—a shredded 
poem—demanded an equally broken response. The speaker does not adopt an ironic tone 
but instead lays bare the errors that she is making and the reason why: "textual delight." 
Other scholars have grumbled about this, one reviewer finding it particularly 
"misleading" to read the Alkman piece as a poem rather than as a fragment (Cropp 
"Arion"). The most important aspersion cast on Carson's overall project, however, comes 
from David Solway, who in several interviews and articles from recent years has 
criticized Carson's critical and artistic skill. Carson and her "gullible readership" together 
sustain what Solway calls a "mediocrity industry." He uses a wide range of pejoratives to 
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characterize her work and its reception, all of them associated with fraud or shamming: 
"sleight of hand," "forgery," "negative biomimicry," "a pyramid scheme," and "a 
professional scam" (Solway 39-58). Solway's point is that pseudo-intellectuals devote 
themselves to Carson (a "cipher") because she plays into their mediocre expectations and 
poor reading skills. His anxiety stems from a broader unease with the general state of the 
Canadian public's education, a public that, with its American counterpart, is responsible 
for Carson's celebrity. Other Canadian poets of note, in particular Margaret Atwood and 
Michael Ondaatje, are also a product of our cultural degeneration. Members of our 
culture hunger after fragmentary pleasures, brief fervors that reassure us about our 
intellectual position and right to consume. Solway's argumentation relies on language 
that echoes Matthew Arnold's in referencing apparently timeless and unchanging criteria 
of value: "Carson writes on litmus paper which tells us who and what we are.. .patchwork 
creatures without genuine moral and intellectual substance, preference machines lusting 
for unmerited approval, media constructs even in the privacy of our being" (50). 
The special deficiencies of Carson's poetry Solway attributes to a serious absence 
of "the complex density of effects and tensile strengths that define the techne of the 
vocation" (14-5), a result of it being "oblivious to quality, content, genuine facility with 
language, and moral and aesthetic grist" (39). Solway's fear is that all contemporary 
poems will "degenerate... into a mere rhapsody of impressions or ultralite reflections," if 
they have not already done so (13). He also deems Carson's output inappropriately 
excessive, claiming, "restraint is a sign of both self-knowledge and charity" (14). In sum, 
Carson is a poet of with no identifiable skills ("techne"), who prefers the mode of 
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"rhapsody" and who is in general rampant and uncharitable with her writing. Solway 
goes on to connect Carson's lack of control with appropriation and impersonation when 
he describes her preparing her own punishment in the "Inferno...condemned to protean 
evanescence, exchanging identities with and repeating the forms and gestures of others" 
(25). 
It is not my intention, at least not directly, to defend Carson's work by picking 
apart these statements, especially since the critics Ian Rae and Chris Jennings have both 
published thorough and precise responses to Solway's critique. My interest lies in the 
way that this critique, with its demand for poetic professionalism and definable skills 
(techne) in Carson and other poets, replicates the criticisms that Socrates made of the 
rhapsode Ion in the dialogue of the same name. The treatment that Carson in Men in the 
Off Hours gives to authors and figures such as Catherine Deneuve, Virginia Woolf, 
Audubon, Thucydides, Artaud, Freud, Giotto, Edward Hopper, and Ingeborg Bachmann 
(in a book that Solway calls a "farrago") finds a parallel with the treatment that Ion gives 
to the poetry of Homer in the professional displays of passion which it was his job to 
deliver. W.K. Wimsatt and Cleanth Brooks, in the first chapter of their volume Literary 
Criticism, describe the Ion as the beginning of a longstanding argument in literary study 
between those who read for affective force (Ion) and those who read with critical distance 
to achieve the goals of reason (Socrates). Here is how they describe the former 
profession: 
2
 "An exalted or exaggeratedly enthusiastic expression of sentiment or feeling; an 
effusion (e.g. a speech, letter, poem) marked by extravagance of idea and expression, but 
without connected thought or sound argument." (OED) 
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A rhapsode.. .was a person who might be described, in terms of our own culture, 
as a sort of combined actor and college teacher of literature. He gave public 
recitations from the Iliad and the Odyssey, especially of the more exciting 
passages; and he undertook to deliver critical and moral lectures. (5) 
Why exactly does the dialogue matter in the larger context of Plato's project? The 
rhapsode's pedagogical or educational extension, the manner in which his enthusiastic, 
unrestrained performances exerted influence on the public at large, establishes the context 
of the concern. The profession was "distinguished and lucrative" (Lamb 404), and in the 
dialogue itself Socrates claims, with characteristic irony, that he envies the rhapsodes' 
beautiful and luxurious clothing, with Ion himself informing us that he has been awarded 
a "golden crown" for winning the competition ("Carson is essentially not a poet. She is a 
prize-reaping machine" [Solway qtd. in Heer]). But what, Socrates wants to know, is 
Ion's actual skill? What is it that he does? For Ion is only capable of reciting or 
commenting on the poetry of Homer, not on that of Hesiod or Archilochos, for example, 
and this leads Socrates to announce that Ion has not mastered any subject (techne) 
whatsoever, and is in fact only impelled by a divine force {dynamis) 
as a 'Magnetic' stone moves iron rings.. .This stone not only pulls those rings, if 
they're iron, it also puts power in the rings, so that they in turn can do just what 
the stone does - pull other rings - so that there's sometimes a very long chain of 
iron pieces and rings hanging from one another. And the power in all of them 
depends on this stone. (26-7) 
This famous passage illustrates one part of what Socrates find so suspicious about 
the rhapsode's practice, that is, the magnetism or contamination of force that proceeds 
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unmediated from God to poet, to rhapsode, to the audience. It doesn't matter at this stage 
in Plato's career what message is being transmitted through the chain, only that a 
definable agent negotiating or opposing the affective force remains completely absent. 
What we get in the Ion is a model of the aesthetic that does not depend, as it will come to 
depend in the Republic, on successive imitations of forms with Ideals at the top and art 
objects at the bottom, but a circuit of collisions that do not represent but actually transmit 
force—divine force—itself, in a manner that anticipates the Longinian sublime. "When / 
tell a sad story," Ion tells Socrates, "my eyes are full of tears, and when I tell a story 
that's frightening or awful, my hair stands on end with fear and my heart jumps" (28). 
Carson enjoys this kind of magnetic transmission. In "Foam: On the Sublime in Longinus 
and Antonioni," she describes the effects of the sublime as a transmission of passion from 
poet, to character, to critic, to reader, in a succession strikingly similar to the magnetic 
chain we just saw Socrates describe: "The passionate moment echoes from soul to soul. 
Each controls it temporarily... To feel the joy of the Sublime is to be inside creative 
power for a moment, to share a bit of electric extra life with the artist's invention" 
{Decreation 46). 
The Ion, in sum, places two models of interpretation in opposition: on the one 
hand, Socrates, characterized by ironic distance, light but respectful mockery, and 
detachment from the affective impact of poetry and, on the other hand, Ion himself, who 
stands as an devoted transmitter of poetic power to an audience, one who deliberately 
enters emotionally charged states. Both Socrates and Ion "take on" certain positions or 
roles, but the nature of their impersonations are very different. For example, Socrates 
pretends to respect Ion, but Ion does not "pretend" to be Homer. The relation between Ion 
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and Homer is much stranger. For one thing, there is no dialectical performance underway, 
no strategy to uncover a truth that hovers somewhere above the shadows of this world. 
All that matters is the intensity of Homer himself and the imperative to dissolve into that 
force in the moment. If, for Kierkegaard, "the ironist is the eternal ego for whom no 
actuality is adequate," then Ion presents us with an ego for whom the sound of Homer's 
poetry is adequate; he is a critic that interprets Homer on the ground the poetry makes 
available and demands. A large part of the value Kierkegaard assigns to Socratic irony 
concerns its ability to break away from "immediacy." In Kierkegaard's work, the word 
"immediacy" and its cognates "are linked by the notion of something's being 
unmediated, directly given" (Cross 136). The immediate state does not carry the potential 
for critical reflection. And this uncritical talent of Ion's, his ability to impersonate 
Homeric states and deliver them to be felt by an audience is what Socrates attacks. Ion, a 
beautifully adorned stylist, presents a surface deeper than any ground (Deleuze Logic 
141). 
We can observe Carson's opinions about the mechanisms of Socratic control and 
the necessity of controlling the presentation of identity in the concluding sentences of the 
essay "The Gender of Sound" at the end of the volume Glass, Irony, and God. Carson has 
just been critiquing the Greek (and particularly Socratic) notion of sophrosyne, which she 
translates basically as "self-control": 
I wonder about this concept of self-control and whether it really is, as the Greeks 
believed, an answer to most questions of human goodness and dilemmas of 
civility. I wonder if there might not be another idea of human order than 
repression, another notion of human virtue than self-control, another kind of 
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human self than one based on dissociation of inside and outside. Or indeed, 
another human essence than self. (136-7) 
The "dissociation of inside and outside" is one of the most important characteristics of 
Kierkegaardian irony, which "always involves a contradiction (or opposition) between 
the external and the internal, between the ironist's inner state and his outward behavior" 
(Cross 127). For Socrates, irony is a way of maintaining sophrosyne. What would it be 
like, a poetry or criticism that forewent self-control, choosing instead to engage 
inspiration and impersonation? 
Socrates's answer for the predicament of the rhapsode is to combine, as Wimsatt 
and Brooks point out, a positive with a negative answer. Ion is "wrong" (adikos) in the 
human sense, that is, his profession relies upon no disceraable skill, but he is also divine, 
in that his power (dynamis) comes from the gods. Socrates believes that Ion has no 
control over the power he receives, that it is a purely passive event. Carson would appear 
to exploit the ambivalence in the word "inspiration," the way we can be inspired by 
something and to do something even simultaneously. Inspiration by the Muses, the source 
of Ion's power, becomes an explicit motif in the short series of poems called 
"Gnosticisms." Each of the six poems in the series involves a frenzied impersonation of a 
bird, other writers, and philosophers. In eighty lines the speaker flies through Homer, 
Wordsworth, Frank O'Hara, Jackson Pollock, Gertrude Stein, J.M. Coetzee, and 
Immanuel Kant. In "Gnosticism V," Wordsworth possesses the speaker as she mundanely 
cleans the kitchen floor in the middle of the night. The mop becomes a paintbrush or a 






of Wordsworth—his little vials, 
Wordsworth collected little vials, 
had hundreds of them, his sister stored them on shelves in the pantry— 
and yes 
to inspire me is why 
I put in a bit of Wordsworth but then the page is over, he weighs it to the 
ground, 
the autumn of him soaking my mop purple in the dyes of what's falling 
breathless under its own 
senses. {Decreation 92) 
The poem records an almost heedless reach towards what seems a random object 
of inspiration: Wordsworth. This does not qualify as an allusion, for there is none of the 
subtlety or discretion that usually accompanies allusion or even reference, and the gesture 
of importing the name "Wordsworth" into this set of verses is made so blatantly that the 
gesture itself becomes the content of the poem. We are presented with a speaker suddenly 
struck with the idea of Wordsworth but who ends up being completely taken up ("but 
then the page is over, he weighs it to the / ground") in the emotions and force that the 
idea carries with it. It is as though Carson swallows the heady contents of one of 
Wordsworth's "little vials" for intoxication. Control is sacrificed, willfully, to participate 
in an experience of force. The whole "Gnosticism" sequence begins with an image of 
attached reading: 
Heavens Lips! I dreamed 
of a page in a book containing the word bird and I 
entered bird. 
Bird grinds on, 
grinds on, thrusting against black. 
For some people a bird sings, feathers shine. I just get this this. (87) 
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The bird in the speaker's book reaches out and forces her into an impersonation, 
one that proceeds or appears to proceed without self-consciousness or self-control. The 
speaker's experience of the bird involves a "this," a somatic immediacy (the body of the 
bird is referenced throughout) that does not circle the animal, describing it in terms of 
"singing" or "shining" but that enters the bird and attempts to enfold within it the whole 
range of movements and emotions that constitute it in the moment of its apprehension. 
The same entrance characterizes the speaker's engagement with Wordsworth in the poem 
discussed above, and echoes the force of the Muse that possesses Homer, then Ion, then 
his audience in a magnetic chain. Muses make their own appearance in "Gnosticism": 
"why / at such a pace / Muses / slam through the house" (89), but here the idea of the 
muse involves everything from divine force to passages from Kant's inaugural 
dissertation ("what the little word "after" means," as Carson quotes it). Carson attempts 
to transmit the states of being that these invoked subjects make available. The goal is not 
to creatively describe or "capture" such entities for the reader's consumption and pleasure 
but to impersonate them in order to show how different roles are or can be imbricated. 
Bird, Homer, Wordsworth—these are not just costumes in which to dress ourselves, or 
gestures to be repeated. In Carson they become singular substances possessed of their 
own textures, colours, and affects that saturate our attention and through which we gain 
access to transformative ways of being. Carson's impersonations treat the facts of literary 
and cultural history as stylistic aspects that make demands on her poetic and critical 
disposition. "For some people a bird sings, feathers shine. I just get this this," she writes, 
diminishing the importance of empirical data (birds do sing, feathers do shine, after all) in 
order to foreground the attitude and modes of being that the bird opened for the poet in 
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the first place. Poets have often looked to birds to provide these kinds of adjustments. For 
Carson, however, passages from Kant's inaugural dissertation may offer as much 
potential for inspired performances. This leads to another kind of impersonation, a critical 
practice imitating aesthetic practice, a gesture that might explain the irritation 
professional scholars and poets such as David Solway feel toward Carson's project. 
MISTRANSLATION 
In "Essay on What I Think about Most," Carson laments the disposition of 
philologists who prefer dry facts to the excitement that wrong interpretations and false 
etymologies can produce. The essay claims to reject philological accuracy on grounds 
that honoring dependable facts should not take precedence over the reader's pleasure. 
Carson once defined poetry as "painting with thoughts and facts": facts, for her, display 
the qualities of materials and substances and may be applied to surfaces with different 
qualities of shade, tint, thickness, shape, line, or any other technique employed by the 
painter. Facts feel different depending on how they are arranged with other facts, with 
other materials. A fact is in conflict with pleasure when it is considered immutable and 
scientific, when its shape (or morphe, the Greek word Carson prefers to describe the 
spatial nature of concepts) is immune to our experience of it. The diminishment of 
accepted data and historicism in favour of aesthetic indulgence distinctly reproduces the 
arguments made in Oscar Wilde's The Decay of Lying, a critical dialogue in which the 
aesthete Vivian makes a quixotic case for lying as the vital activity of poets and artists 
generally, an activity endangered by late-Victorian utilitarianism, morality, and presumed 
fidelity to history: "Facts are not merely finding a footing-place in history, but they are 
usurping the domain of fancy, and have invaded the kingdom of romance. Their chilling 
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touch is over everything" (Wilde 787). Carson responds to the anticipated philological 
objection to her method with a similar admonishment: 
But as you know the chief aim of philology 
is to reduce all textual delight 
to an accident of history. (34) 
While "Essay on What I Think About Most" does not involve mistranslation 
exactly, the jab it makes at philology finds new strength in the mistranslations that inform 
other sections of Men in the Off Hours. Mistranslation becomes, in this context, a willful 
error diverging from what Seth Lerer has called the career of the "dry-as-dust" 
philologist, a figure such as Casaubon on a tedious mission compiling minor corrections 
and amendments in the margins of texts and in the shadow of minds greater than his (6). 
Carson's own definition of mimesis emerged out of a wrong reading of a broken poem: 
"the deliberate break and complication of mistakes / out of which may arise / 
unexpectedness." This is very much in line with the kind of work Seth Lerer would like 
to preserve when he reads philology itself as "a sublime art: an inquiry into word roots or 
poetic fragments that can lead to illumination of the personal, the social, the aesthetic," as 
practiced by a "thrilling pedagogical performer" (Lerer 3-6). Carson's mistranslations, as 
well as her theories of mistranslation, dwell in the potential errors of immediacy and 
improvisation in order to exploit the unique aesthetic potential that false starts and 
unpolished drafts make available. 
The "TV Men" series begins with an invented quotation from "On the Sublime": 
"TV makes things disappear. Oddly the word comes from Latin videre 'to see'" (61). The 
source of the epigraph is given as "de Sublimate, 5.3," but as far as I can tell no such 
section exists. Chapter 5 of On the Sublime is one paragraph long and is universally 
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referred to as 5.1. It concerns the confusion that may occur between good and bad art: 
"Thus, finely structured sentences, sublimities, and pleasing touches contribute to 
correctness; but just as with a lucky result, these very same things also contribute to their 
opposites" (Longinus 36-7). That such a passage is hijacked and rewritten as a comment 
about television comes as no surprise when we consider Carson's opinion about TV 
generally. When asked in an interview "what exactly is terrible about making TV and 
what is terrible about watching TV," Carson responds as follows: 
Well, they are both dead somehow; they are both dead areas. Dead thinking — the 
thinking that goes on in them. Ends up being dead. I am not exactly sure why. 
When you are making TV a lot of the reason is simply repetition. If you have a 
script to perform, you probably have to say the parts of it 20 or 30 times before 
it's recorded properly... A sentence of Homer couldn't survive that treatment. ("In 
Conversation" 5) 
Bad art, for Carson, is repetition. The poem "TV Men: Lazarus" figures the 
Platonic theory of forms as progressive layers of televisions: "our reality is just a TV set / 
inside a TV set inside a TV set" (89). The art that Plato attacks and that Carson represents 
as a kind of television involves dilution, a loss of vitality as the object represented gets 
"further and further away" from its source. Rather than reproduce Longinus, Carson goes 
off somewhere else. "Essay on What I Think About Most" offers another theory of art 
that bears mentioning now, a theory based on Aristotle's notion that metaphor produces 
errors that give rise to the unexpected. Metaphorical words are the third of three kinds: 
Strange words simply puzzle us; 
ordinary words convey what we know already; 
it is from metaphor that we can get hold of something new & fresh 
{Rhetoric, 1410M0-13). (30) 
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For Carson, then, metaphor is useful insofar as it offers something new. While for Plato 
representations are errors because they weaken or dilute the content of an original, 
Carson's Aristotle envisions every worthy figurative use of language and act of imitation 
as an error that introduces new information, to be conserved in a different order of value. 
"TV Men" is an ironic title insofar as the material within this section "represents 
the kind of thing you can't put into TV, whatever real language is in it will disappear," as 
Carson says ("In Conversation" 5). However, the weird fabrication of a line from 
Longinus also calls our attention to the way error circumvents or even surpasses the trope 
of irony as the central aesthetic manipulation of "TV Men." As Wayne Booth writes in 
the section "Known Error Proclaimed" from A Rhetoric of Irony, one of the ways to 
identify an ironic text is to look for statements from the speakers that contradict 
commonly held beliefs. "If a speaker betrays ignorance or foolishness that is 'simply 
incredible,' the odds are comparatively high that the author, in contrast, knows what he is 
doing" (57). But does this account for the total rewriting that occurs in the epigraph? Isn't 
the error simply too wrong to be ironic in Booth's sense? Obviously Carson "knows what 
she is doing" in this case, but the effect of the error, when taken alongside the passages 
we've seen so far, is such that whatever irony is achieved is promptly made irrelevant. 
What is relevant in mistranslations is the lack of polish, their irreverent "badness" and the 
pleasure the reader gets from material that refuses to clean itself up, as it were, to recover 
itself to a position of irony, detached from the moment of its composition. 
Another poet's mistranslations form the subject of the poem titled "Samedi" in the 
Artaud sequence of the TV Men series, one that begins ("Lundi") with a meditation on 
Artaud's madness: "The mad state is, as he emphasizes over and over again, empty." The 
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madness of consciousness characterized as a state devoid of anything unaccountable or 
tangible ("You can pull emptiness out of it by the handful") recalls Socrates's critique of 
Ion in emphasizing that artists and their interpreters are technically empty and out of their 
minds (ekphron), and also recalls the vials of Wordsworth sought by the speaker of 
"Gnosticisms." "To the scandal of language [Artaud] does not consent," Carson tells us. 
His refusal leads directly to "false etymology" which, as the speaker explains, makes him 
"bold." We get an example of this kind of false etymology in the following excerpt. 
Carson gives us the text in its original French, translates this precisely in order to call to 
attention Artaud's willful mistake (the first stanza), and then describes the error in the 
second stanza: 
For after, said poetically, after will come the time of blood. 
Since ema in Greek means "blood," and po-ema 
ought to mean 
"after 
the blood" 
"the blood after." 
Let us make first poem, with blood. 
Violence is total here. He deliberately misspells 
the ancient Greek word for poem (poiema) 
as "poema." 
Then misdivides it 
into po and ema (2 nonexistent syllables in Greek), 
wrongly identifying ema with the Greek word for "blood" (haimd) 
in order to etymologize poema as "after the blood after" 
(but in what language does po mean "after"?) 
Poetically indeed. (71) 
Carson connects Artaud's madness with etymological error, even hubris, focusing an 
example of Artaud trying to pull aesthetic practice back from its ironies and toward 
"blood." He wants a type of poem whose origin is neither etymologically nor temporally 
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detached from the body ("let us make first poem, with blood") and mistranslates in order 
to make such an event possible. This "abuse" of language presents a broken but 
passionate and immediate art. Carson tells us that Artaud values the body over the mind: 
"Body is pure. / Everything loathsome is the mind, / which God screws into body with a 
lascivious thrust" (68). This sequence exposes a conjunction of error, madness, 
mistranslation, and somatic immediacy that belies the protective self-reflection of irony: 
For Artaud the real drawback of being mad is not that consciousness 
is crushed and torn but that he cannot say so, 
fascinating as this would be, while it is happening. 
But only 
later when somewhat "recovered" and so much less convincingly. (66) 
"Recovered" suggests both the remission from madness but also retreat to a position of 
safety, of being recovered, having traversed a distance from the passionate, mad moment, 
when inside and outside collapse and error prevails. If irony's strength, especially as 
Kierkegaard sees it, involves its capacity to relocate us above the immediacy of our social 
and historical position, Artaud figures this aspect as a "drawback," a frailty that denies us 
the power of madness in the moment when it possesses us. Time's imposed "recoveries," 
said to belie madness and its power, function in a parallel manner to the device used to 
frame the Artaud poems themselves. TV becomes a species of imitation said to fail 
exactly because it attempts to make errors "disappear," to present a smooth unbroken 
surface, an apparently untroubled imitation that aims only for verisimilitude. Carson 
prefers flat-out wrongness and negation to any kind of subtle irony, the jarring effect of 
anachronism or catachresis to winking or shamming. Her mistranslations depart 
avowedly and globally, without any of irony's caginess. 
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Consider the way that error itself is thematized in the following mistranslation, 
"Salve Nee Minimo Puella Naso (Hello Not Very Small Nosed Girl)": 
Your nose is wrong. 
Your feet are wrong. 
Your eyes are wrong your mouth is wrong. 
Your pimp is wrong even his name is wrong. 
Who cares what they say, you're not— 
Why can't I 
Live in the nineteenth century. (39) 
Catullus's poem inveighs against a woman for not being the true object of his 
affection, a beloved who goes under the alias Lesbia. He addresses a woman whose 
different parts, each of them flawed, combine to form a portrait of a woman who is in 
error just by existing. The anachronistic intervention at the end of the poem, a botched 
rendition of the line "o saeclum insapiens et infacetum" (which Peter Green translates as 
"Oh this tasteless age, ill-bred and witless") represents an attempt on Carson's part to 
reproduce in the reader the sensations involved with looking upon an object whose parts 
somehow don't add up to what we know they are meant signify (Green 91). Carson 
imitates the speaker's unease in looking at a woman (not his lover) by creating unease in 
the reader looking at a poem (not the "true" one). Wrong objects of desire and wrong 
translations are brought to the reader's attention in a single gesture. This suggests a queer 
kind of reading, one that favours the replication of aesthetic effects over the transmission 
of technical facts, a strategy of impersonation similar to the one employed with the 
figures of "Gnosticisms." Catullus becomes not an historical figure to be translated and 
studied at arm's length but a role that we may choose to inhabit and experience at will. 
The fifth verse, "Who cares what they say, you're not—", leaves out the word 
bellam (pretty) and the name Lesbia, which appear in the actual text of Catullus's poem. 
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Carson's mistranslation produces a suspension that does not appear in the original. The 
truncation of the line apparently signals a wish to break away entirely from the correct 
object of desire that supposedly grounds the speaker, followed up by a desire to be 
relocated in the nineteenth-century. "Why can't I / live in the nineteenth century", also a 
negative statement, announces the utter distance of the poem from Victorian (specifically 
Arnoldian) perfection, sweetness, and light, from the security of cultural touchstones and 
completed and intelligible cultural artifacts. Missing the mark, our pleasures are distinct, 
wholly changed. The translator, by refusing to incorporate the correct object of desire, 
insists on dwelling in the failed version of the lover and the failed version of Catullus's 
poem. Just as the woman in the poem usurps the position of the true beloved, Carson's 
poem usurps the original, negates it and interposes itself egregiously. It is a gesture that 
suppresses the urge to merely translate "with a new twist" and dispenses with the notion 
of a subtle, ironic refashioning. It makes a hubristic, irreverent leap. 
Hubristic and irreverent leaps are the subject of the next, final section of this 
chapter. Catachresis has suggested itself at several points as the trope that comes closest 
to describing Carson's aesthetic practices and to offering a tropic alternative to irony, for 
catachresis may mix up its metaphors, appear unearned, counter-intuitive, overreaching, 
or may involve the confusion of parts of speech, changing a demonstrative pronoun 
("this") or preposition into a noun, for example. More than any instance of irony, 
therefore, catachresis appears to err. The next section will consider exactly how Carson 
uses catachresis and how this trope may serve to enrich the different aspects of error that 
I have been arguing for so far. 
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CATACHRESIS 
Against usage. In common discourse, catachresis is understood as a surprising or 
unearned metaphor or figure, principally a "mixed metaphor." "Take arms against a sea 
of troubles," is the classic example. However, the earliest extant account of the trope 
comes from Quintillian in his Institutio oratorio, where it is defined as a "transfer of 
terms from one place to another employed when no proper word exists" (Parker 60). 
Derrida, writing in White Mythology, deconstructs the difference between "proper" 
metaphor, which is limited to the comparison of regular nouns, and "improper" 
catachresis, that may force words which are not nouns into tropic or figural use, 
disrupting the opposition between figural and proper meanings: "Every word which 
resists this nominalization would remain foreign to metaphor" (Derrida 233). So we have 
a few definitions of catachresis, which together indicate a desire to disrupt or abuse the 
ordinary surface of language in order to call attention to something previously 
unavailable. Now irony too involves a complication of surfaces, a manipulation of 
linguistic regularity that aims to expose language's inadequacy in representing an order 
that lies behind, above, or beyond an actuality. Catachresis, however, manifests such 
complications on the level of the surface, without referencing some ineffable and superior 
plane. Catachresis may complicate and defamiliarize in an outrageous, and therefore 
highly visible manner. 
Let's assume for the time being that David Solway is correct when he says Carson 
"cannot consistently manage metaphor," and that her metaphors and similes may in 
general be unearned, farfetched, and certainly mixed (Solway "Interview"). An example 
from The Beauty of the Husband suffices to make his case: "my husband / could fill 
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structures of/ threat with a light like the earliest olive oil." Is there something to learn 
from what is superficially a bad use of figure, beyond learning "what not to do?" Derrida 
asks a similar question: "as the best metaphor is never absolutely good, without which it 
would not be a metaphor, does not the bad metaphor always yield the best example?" 
(251). Indeed, even W.K. Wimsatt and Monroe Beardsley in "The Affective Fallacy" 
note the generally defective quality of metaphors: "the vivid realization of metaphor 
comes from its being in some way an obstruction to practical knowledge. Metaphor 
operates by being abnormal or inept, the wrong way of saying something" (36). How 
might our discussion of error, control, and irony up to this point inform our reading of 
such catachrestic events in Carson's work? 
The first lyric in Men in the Off Hours is "First Chaldaic Oracle," an exhortative 
poem composed in the second person, alternating between infinitives and imperatives, 
describing the process by which the mind tries to "know a thing." It is worth quoting in 
full, for the way almost every instance of figurative language in the poem qualifies as 
catachrestic. The instructional, pedagogical tone of the poem should also be emphasized: 
There is something you should know. 
And the right way to know it 
is by a cherrying of your mind. 
Because if you press your mind toward it 
and try to know 
that thing 
as you know a thing, 
you will not know it. 
It comes out of red 
with kills on both sides, 
it is a scrap, it is nightly, 
it kings your mind. 
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No. Scorch is not the way 
to know 
that thing you must know. 
But use the hum 
of your wound 
and flamepit out everything 
right to the edge 
of that thing you should know. 
The way to know it 
is not by staring hard. 
But keep chiseled 
keep Praguing the eye 
of your soul and reach-
mind empty 
towards that thing you should know 
until you get it. 
That thing you should know. 
Because it is out there (orchid) outside your and, it is. (10-11) 
What could it mean to "cherry" your mind? Or to "Prague" the eye of your soul? 
What kind of a method is "scorch" or "flamepit?" What exactly is your "and?" And what 
is that orchid doing there in parentheses in the last line? Catachrestic language interrupts 
and confuses what is in general a plain and direct style of address. Yet the poem also calls 
itself an "oracle," an instructional message, characterized by occlusion and riddling. We 
have nouns used as verbs ("cherry," "Prague," "flamepit"), verbs used as nouns 
("scorch") and a conjunction nominalized and controlled by a possessive pronoun ("your 
and"}. What oracle is being offered? 
Carson is actually translating (again, badly) the first of the Chaldaean Oracles, 
which name a collection of Neoplatonic religious commentaries generally agreed to have 
been composed in ancient Greek somewhere between the second and third centuries C.E., 
Reader 33 
but that have come to us in fragments (Des Places 7-10). The metaphyshical system they 
delineate involves the division of the universe into three categories: the Intelligible, the 
Intellectual, and the Elementary. It is a fundamentally dualistic religious system, and also 
deeply patriarchal: this world disguises a truer one that lies beyond, a justification of the 
ironic outlook if ever there was one. However, the Oracles also contain injunctions that 
assist us in apprehending the divine: Neoplatonists were theurgical, that is, they believed 
magical work could help the soul to attain the goal of knowing the divine. What Carson 
translates as "by a cherrying of the mind" is noou anthei, more literally "by the flower of 
the mind." The secondary meaning the lexicon gives for anthos, however is "anything 
thrown out upon the surface, froth, scum." From these Carson magically gets 
"cherrying." 
If catachresis is a hubristic figure, then, its overreach does not extend upward, 
toward the heights of critical reflection, toward the "gods" or some persistent ultimate 
reality. Its overreach extends across the surface of our language, along the froth and scum 
of it; it wrenches words out of their proper places and pastes them into others where they 
don't belong. "That thing you should know," the poet tells us, exists "outside your and" 
(epei noou exo huparchei). The possessive pronoun qualifying a conjunction, which does 
not occur in the Greek, suggests that the addressee is forever compiling things, making 
lists, linking discrete units together within the proper rules of grammar. By 
substantivizing "and" Carson subverts the grammatical logic that allows us to relate 
things alongside one another while maintaining their discretion in the nominal order. 
The most unusual and bizarre word in the poem, however (with the exception of 
"Praguing"), is "orchid" in parentheses in the last line. Indeed, the word does not "scan" 
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properly: the parentheses themselves, it could be argued, are being wrongly used, for the 
word within seems to contribute no information to the words that come before and after 
it. Now orchids are known for their bizarre, complex, utterly beautiful flowers. They 
grow on the roots, branches, and stems of other flora, surprising the eye as it moves along 
the surface of a plant or a tree. Thus they interrupt a regular system counter-intuitively, 
abnormally, excessively, just as catachresis makes a "sudden and unexpected intrusion" 
into a text. The parenthetical word "orchid" performs the same action on the last line of 
"First Chaldaic Oracle", appending itself even as that line enjoins us to forget the simple 
mechanism of addition, to dwell instead on the adjustment and entrance into unusual 
states that "cherrying" and "Praguing" demand. 
Thus, Carson's catachrestic use of language exhorts us to seek satisfaction in a 
mechanism that does not negate the given materials of this world or merely compare 
existing, stable entities for the satisfaction of conjoining them (as regular metaphor does). 
Catachresis, like the impersonations of Ion and Carson in "Gnosticism," requires the 
entrance into improvisational, incipient states continually adjusting to conditions 
previously uncharted. Remember that catachresis' original definition in Quintillian 
characterized it as an attempt to name something previously unnamed or unnamable. 
Irony declares the significance of a truer reality behind our words and deeds, behind even 
the physical world, that will never be properly named. Understanding this and declaring 
its irrelevance, Carson adopts a more pragmatic approach, attempting to name processes, 
states of being, ways of knowing, and possible responses previously unnamed but just 
becoming effable. Patricia Parker draws attention to important ideological differences 
that attend metaphor and catachresis. Rhetoricians from Aristotle to Quintillian to David 
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Solway have commented on the "mastery" of metaphor, the way its use presupposes a 
luxury of reflective contemplation and control, "based on the perception of resemblance 
by a controlling subject who applied the figure at will" (Parker 70). Catachresis, by 
contrast, foregoes mastery, it "fatigues" the mind with its hubris; the demand it makes is 
much greater than metaphor, but then again it also makes a greater promise (Parker 63). 
"First Chaldaic Oracle" represents a pedagogical encounter, a set of instructions 
on how "to know a thing" and, because it appears at the beginning of the volume, on how 
to read the rest of Men in the Off Hours itself. An eccentric and quixotic education is the 
central concern of the poem and of the book as a whole. Carson, obviously, is not just a 
poet and critic but an active teacher in the academy. What kind of offering might the 
poetic and rhetorical events discussed in this essay make available for pedagogy and 
education? How does error function not only as a viable critique of an ironic, masterful 
aesthetic practice but of distant, ironic pedagogy as well? I have used impersonation, 
mistranslation, and catachresis as components of error that allow for a movement which 
irony forbids. Always allowing its users to recover themselves to a position of security 
and mastery, irony is a defensive posture committed to the belief that error brings "shame 
and remorse," as Carson says. Irony allows people to err without "really" erring: all the 
movement of our everyday ironic speech and action fluctuates around a stability that 
exists outside of it. But what if we allowed ourselves to be wrong without referring to 
some secure objective place? Is there a way of accepting error as a productive event that 
needn't be thwarted by the shame that attends it all too often? The specifically 
pedagogical and educational consequences of the rhetorical gestures outlined in this 
chapter represent the focus of the next. 
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CHAPTER 2 
"WHAT FEELS WRONG:" ERRANT PEDAGOGY IN "IRONY IS N O T E N O U G H " 
Who does not end up a female impersonator? 
—Anne Carson. Stanzas, Sexes, Seduction 
Carson refuses the mastery of normative metaphor for catachresis, the ironic 
posturing of Socrates and Solway for the immediacy of impersonation. Just as Socrates 
criticizes Ion's method of interpreting Homer, David Solway faults Carson's devotion to 
wayward aesthetics and criticism. Both Ion and Carson are deviant in desiring to err, to 
descend into the subjects of their work, to impersonate rather than speculate, to inhabit 
the positions and dispositions that their subjects make available without a will to master 
those personae or use them to fix universal truths. Carson wants to treat facts as 
readymade materials with their own aesthetic properties, as surfaces against which other 
facts and materials may come into focus. Socrates and Solway both oppose this kind of 
practice on the grounds that it requires no real skill or mastered technique, that such a 
model does not even seem to require the existence of a thinking, rational agent propelling 
and managing the action. Instead, there are only generalities, impulsive and energetic, 
that move through a circuit in which Muses, audience, poets, and actors constitute only 
the stations such generalities occupy momentarily. 
For both Socrates and Solway the problem with this kind of thinking is ethical and 
pedagogical. They focus on the influence that Carson and Ion wield as powerful 
impersonators in the public eye. We cannot have magnetized citizens allowing figures 
and personae from literature and art to stand in for real thinking and thoughtful action. 
Such behavior can only limit autonomy and enfeeble our attempts at self-mastery. Irony, 
then, both results from and permits the intercession of reason, a way of gaining an angle 
and a vantage on one's own actions and the state of the world—but what does it exclude? 
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Are we shortchanging ourselves if we embrace it, as Kierkegaard would like, as a whole 
way of life? A Socratic policy of ironic education and artistry would classify Carson as a 
problematic educator, for refusing to interpose the requisite distance between her 
purified, professional self and the sensational, emotional pressures of the moment. As she 
writes in a "Note on Method": "There is too much self in my writing" (Economy vii), and 
she means her critical writing. There exists in her work a desire to know if irony is an 
essential component of critical thinking and writing. How can critical thought occur on 
paper and in the classroom without sacrificing the sensations that the world makes 
available to us in the unfolding present? How do we "get a hold" of ourselves on that 
edge without leaning on some stability beyond this this? 
The central text of this chapter is "Irony is Not Enough: Essay on My Life as 
Catherine Deneuve (2nd Draft)," a piece that stages the limits and benefits of Socratic 
irony in an often neglected nexus of critical thought: the contemporary graduate seminar. 
It juxtaposes in its very title a declaration of irony's insufficiency and a will to 
impersonate; its content concerns the institutionalized split between surface and depth, 
between a cool, professional code of conduct and the "bits of fire" that stream beneath 
that exterior. What the poem ultimately compares, however, are two very different maps 
of the educational process, perhaps even two schematic approaches to the kind of work 
Socrates performs. On the one hand, we have the ironic procedure that adopts a sequence 
of postures and assumed positions, all of which present different kinds of errors, in order 
to establish that truth exists somewhere beyond the misrepresentations of this world. 
Prepositionally, this process goes up, ascending the wrong rungs of the ladder one after 
another, to a place where forms are ideal and pure, persistent and irrevocable. The 
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educator assumes different wrong positions and forces her students to take up wrong 
positions in order to draw their attention towards this other plane. But what might happen 
if an educator erred without a "point" in mind, without forcing attention on some superior 
reality that our sublunary world failed to obtain? What would replace "the ideal" in this 
model? In this case the ascent would be replaced by a movement that makes no attempt to 
orient itself toward a transcendent ideality, but that roves through different positions and 
roles in order to modulate to intensity of the inquiry, to continually freshen and 
defamiliarize the terms of that inquiry. The goal here is to keep things moving without 
mourning this movement, as irony does, always trying to raise up a platform from which 
to overlook the rushes of time. As Carson goes on to say in the "Note on Method": 
"Attention is a task we share, you and I. To keep attention strong means to keep it from 
settling" (viii). It is a strange statement, considering that we ordinarily think strong 
attention involves focusing on an object in its discretion for a span of time. The longer 
the span, the stronger the attention. For Carson the strength of attention depends on a 
different kind of thinking, on distraction, on straying away from normal modes of 
thought and, as we shall see, erring away from institutionally assigned roles. 
We will begin with a summary and close reading of "Irony is Not Enough," 
describing how the piece figures Socratic irony as well as threats to its authority. Given 
that the piece details an erotic relationship between a professor (Deneuve) and her female 
student (Girl), its obsession with classroom dynamics of power and impersonation, and 
its very reliance on a cinematic conceit, certain observations that feminist and queer 
theorists have made on pedagogical relations will assist in translating the discussion into 
contemporary terms. Along this trajectory, I will read selected scenes from two films that 
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directly address women and aesthetic education. The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie and 
Notes on a Scandal both exhibit anxiety over alternative pedagogies (based on 
impersonation and intimacy rather than irony); their narratives code such educational 
practices as sexually threatening. That is, the films cannot imagine teachers and students 
straying from their institutionally assigned positions without also wanting to engage in 
sex acts with each other. Intriguingly, Carson's piece does not decide on rigid 
professionalism or erotic encounter, but it does make important suggestions that we move 
away from erotic metaphors to describe the possible and probable intimacies and 
intensities that keep the humanities classroom rolling. At the end of this chapter, 
therefore, I will conclude by considering the value that error and impersonation have for 
refreshing the terms of the humanist educational project. 
RAPIDS: "IRONY IS NOT ENOUGH" 
An author impersonates an actor, a poem impersonates an essay, an essay 
impersonates a film. In 1996 Andre Techine released Les Voleurs, a film starring 
Catherine Deneuve as a professor of philosophy pursuing a sexual relationship with a 
female student embroiled in a crime ring. Later in the same year, Carson adapted this 
episode of the film in "Irony is Not Enough: Essay on My Life as Catherine Deneuve." In 
Carson's version, Deneuve is a professor of archaic and ancient Greek lyric (specializing 
in the poems and fragments of Sappho) and the girl one of her wayward students. Any 
trace of an existing sexual relationship with the girl Carson suppresses to the realm of 
fantasy. The essay is actually a poem, thirty pages long and arranged in tercets, visually 
echoing the length and structure of one of Carson's more famous works, "The Glass 
Essay," that also involves the impersonation of an artistic figure, Emily Bronte. Now 
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"The Glass Essay" juxtaposes the personal life of a brokenhearted speaker with Bronte's 
biographical details and the themes and characters of Wuthering Heights, presenting a 
critic unwilling to detach her writing on Bronte from the conditions in the world that gave 
rise to the critical act in the first place. The result is a piece on Bronte that encourages the 
reader's attention to oscillate between the critic, the author under observation, and the 
content of that author's works. In "Irony is Not Enough," Carson performs the same kind 
of sublime manipulation but in a specifically pedagogical context, inhabiting and 
overlapping the roles of Deneuve, Sappho and Socrates simultaneously as she teaches 
Sappho's poetry and works on an essay about Socratic irony. 
"Irony is Not Enough" actually exists in two versions. What Carson calls the "2n 
Draft" is published in Men in the Off Hours. Here, fourteen separately titled prose 
paragraphs present Deneuve lecturing in the seminar, reading poetry with her students, 
working in her office, or hosting a dinner for her students at home. The first draft gives 
slightly more extensive readings of both Socratic irony and of Sappho's fragments. The 
second draft excludes most of the lyric fragments and philosophy. In prose, it focuses 
more intensely on a way of being in the world and a way of relating to that world. What 
kind of attitude does it represent? It refers to the context of Socratic irony without 
offering many details about it, and is in many ways an incomplete version of its 
precedent. This is still only a draft ("a plan, a sketch, or a drawing, especially of a work 
to be executed" [OED]) and as such continues the poetic impersonations, mistranslations, 
and improvisations of catachresis examined in the first chapter. As a draft it also signals 
the provisional nature of impersonation, suggesting that in the future Deneuve may even 
be replaced with another figure for different effects. 
Reader 41 
This novel inhabitation of roles allows us to consider teaching in a theatrical way. 
For our teachers do more than instruct us about the works on their syllabi. In many ways 
they come to embody those works, they "act them out" for us, and not only the works, but 
their authors and the critical heritage that surrounds them as well. Teachers claim a part 
of the attention we give to texts and authors, whether they like it or not. Catherine 
Deneuve, a film persona who attracts the magnetized gaze of the audience, becomes 
Carson's figure for this effect. When she teaches Sappho or writes on Socrates, she not 
only embodies those writers but, in doing so, also ends up feeling like Deneuve because 
of the way her body becomes the locus of student attention. It is not the case that a "real" 
personality overtakes the teaching persona. Jane Gallop has said of "the personal" in 
pedagogy that it is always already an impersonation, that pedagogues must find a way of 
performing the texts and their "selves" {Pedagogy 12). The wandering impersonations of 
Socrates, Sappho, and Deneuve exhibit the movement of such a performance. We have 
seen how Carson views the physical condition of the fragment—the fragment as 
artifact—as a rich source of information. In "Irony is Not Enough" she considers the 
material conditions of the pedagogical relation, made up of institutional norms, affects, 
and role-playing. What force do these conditions exert on our experience of texts? 
Now the Socratic pedagogical model involves placing teachers at a distance from 
their students, from which they attempt to trick or tease those students into independent 
acts of understanding through an ironic manipulation of different surfaces. As we saw in 
Chapter One, the rhapsode Ion also participates in a play of surfaces. He wears beautiful 
clothes, the raiment and jewellery culled from his public success; he impersonates the 
emotional intensities of Homeric poetry in order for his audience to gain access to the 
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same force. The two models place a different value on presentation, what is immediately 
apprehended by students or an audience. Carson illustrates the Socratic method as 
follows, in two passages from the first draft of her essay: 
Socrates 
uses "irony" 
to draw a veil over 
the question that is jutting out from him. The veil 
is made of feints and lesser proofs 
and half-burnings. Why not just ask the question? (20-1) 
The surface does not match what is going on inside. 
The surface (for example) does not 
stream with bits of fire. (17) 
Irony allows Socrates to disguise a protruding question "jutting out from him." This 
question (unspecified) behaves like an erection, like an uncontrolled part of the body 
comically and inappropriately drawing attention to itself through its own exaggeration. 
Ion, on the other hand, wants the "bits of fire" to show. He transmits "Homer" to his 
audience through affect, by taking on the somatic, affective attitudes of Homer's 
language and characters. Rather than a veil donned in order to jolt the student into 
realizations of their own foolishness (the counterpart to the ironist in classical terms is the 
alazon: the dupe, braggart, or fool), surface in Ion's pedagogy is a site of communication, 
connection, and the transfer of information. The disjunction between surface and depth is 
an essential feature of Kierkegaard's account of irony; it directly contradicts the Ionic, 
Longinian mode, where a representation and the object of a representation interconnect in 
a new synthesis. Homer could be said to possess Ion's body, while Ion allows, 
encourages, and adjusts to the possession as it unfolds. 
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As Stephen Knapp has illustrated, Socrates' distrust of Ion appears to stem from 
the claim the latter makes for the value of a concrete representation of Homer; this 
involves Ion claiming a portion of the audience's attention for himself (Knapp 65). In 
general this would seem to account for much of the anxiety that critics such as David 
Solway feels towards Carson as well. Ion and Carson do not simply and transparently 
direct their students to the texts on their syllabi. They insert themselves between students 
and texts in such a way that guarantees for themselves a portion of the "prize money," as 
it were, a portion of our attention that, in the view of Socrates and Solway, should be 
reserved entirely for the object under consideration as it exists independent of any 
concrete manifestation. The more exclusively we attend to the concrete manifestations of 
ideals, the greater the error. Surface, in the passage from Carson's poem quoted above, is 
designed to manage the affective conditions of the pedagogical relation, to suppress the 
"bits of fire" in order to make way for the clear and unpolluted acts of attention the 
graduate seminar is supposed to engender. 
It is not so much of a leap, I think, to take the question of surface quite literally. 
Eve Kosofsky Sedgwick's Touching Feeling: Performativity, Affect, Pedagogy mobilizes 
the sense of touch, the experience of texture, and the importance of surface to ground her 
wider arguments about, for example, the performative extension of shame, non-paranoid 
modes of critical reading, and a pedagogy motivated by mutual interest and excitement 
rather than suspicion. As literary scholars, Sedgwick contends, we are instructed to 
distrust outward appearances, to suspect that presentations are always disguising 
(intentionally or not) actual, "deeper" meanings, and that this kind of emotional stance 
carries with it an implicit set of spatial and temporal relations to the subjects under our 
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investigation. Meaning always rests beneath or beyond us in space, ahead of us in time, 
yet wherever meaning lurks its essence and consequences are inevitable, that is, they 
cannot and will not surprise us with their appearance. She counters this arrangement by 
offering the preposition beside: 
Invoking a Deleuzian interest in planar relations, the irreducibly spatial 
positionality of beside also seems to offer some useful resistance to the ease with 
which beneath and beyond turn from spatial descriptors into implicit narratives of, 
respectively, origin and telos. (8)3 
Carson is an author obsessed with prepositions ("Sometimes at night I awake thinking of 
prepositions. Perhaps they are clues") (Glass 41). In particular, her proclivity for "with" 
and the nomimalized "withness" involve the kind of resistance Sedgwick argues for. 
"What kind of withness is it?" she asks of the Greek preposition pros, which begins the 
Gospel of John: pros theon ("The word was with God") (Economy viii). 
Different approaches to surface, therefore, correspond to different values. 
Sedgwick refers to Renu Bora's distinction between smoothness, "both a type of texture 
and texture's other" (qtd. 14), which blocks information about itself, and another kind of 
texture ("texxture") "that is dense with offered information about how, substantively, 
historically, materially, it came into being." Bora sees smoothness as the preferred texture 
of the middle class. Sedgwick's examples of its opposites include "a brick or a metalwork 
pot that still bears the scars and uneven sheen of its making" (14). Carson's examples 
would include the fragments of poetry written on papyri that "come to us in wreckage," 
3
 "We learn nothing from those who say: 'Do as I do,'" writes Gilles Deleuze. "Our only 
teachers are those who tell us to 'do with me'" (Difference 23). 
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an effect replicated in the drafts and sloppy translations of Men in the Off Hours. "In 
surfaces," she says, "perfection is less interesting" ("Art" 202). Errors themselves 
constitute disruptions to a surface, a fact that Carson points out in "Essay on What I 
Think About Most," paraphrasing Aristotle: 
[Aristotle] pictures the mind moving along a plane surface 
of ordinary language 
when suddenly 
that surface breaks or complicates. 
Unexpectedness emerges. 
Irony operates according to Bora's definition of "smoothness" (who, after all, is smoother 
than Socrates?), and Socrates exemplifies Sedgwick's model of the paranoid critic better 
than any other. Indeed, in a lecture hall or a seminar room all professors are expected to 
be both smooth and paranoid in this way, to proceed without interference from the bodies 
in the classroom toward previously scripted destinations. Catherine Deneuve, bourgeois 
darling, personifies the middle-class desire for a slick, well-managed outward 
appearance. The Socratic criticism of Ion concerns in large part the latter's renunciation 
of control, authority, and mastery over his passionate displays. "Anyone can tell," 
Socrates tells him, "that you are powerless to speak about Homer on the basis of 
knowledge or mastery" (25). As such, the/o« is as much a critique of a pedagogical 
model as it is a critique of poetry or the wild, affective force of language. Critical thinkers 
and effective pedagogues are meant to take their affective reactions to texts and students 
and smooth them down to a slick surface of professional aplomb and exemplarity, all the 
excesses relegated to subtext. Ion and Carson, however, win the attention of their students 
and readers by not disguising or restraining their reactions and responses as they occur, 
by moving through time with their interlocutors, alongside them, while the surface 
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enriches, breaks and complicates, disruptions acknowledged and encouraged as part of 
the intellectual movement underway. As I mentioned before, this is not necessarily a call 
for professors to start relating personal anecdotes at every turn. As Carson shows, what 
matters is that we become aware that the attention of our students involves our "real" 
presence and the manner in which we manage that concrete event. 
Surely though, you might say, Socrates is not simply some dull ogre forcing his 
students toward absent, inevitable truths on some pleasureless march. His irony is 
exciting, dramatic, stimulating, and in the end his performance may be much more 
thrilling than the one Ion offers. At least in "Irony is Not Enough," it is clear that Carson 
is well aware of the potential value that arises from a division between inside and outside, 
but these benefits are rarely, if ever, seen by us in our day-to-day lives: 
Do you know how diamonds get to us? 
Three hundred miles 
underground 
are heats and pressures that crush carbon 
into sparkling shapes. 
These are driven 
to the surface along volcanic corridors called diamond pipes 
and extruded 
onto a crater 
at the top. The journey may take months 
or days 
or hours. 
No human has ever witnessed a diamond eruption. (33) 
I do not want to say that Socratic irony is ineffective; quite the opposite. What I question, 
and what I believe Carson's work puts into jeopardy, is the traditional narrative of the 
Socratic performance as an ironic procedure that reaches upward to fixed ideals, leaving 
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all the diamonds behind a locked door. Doubtless the theory of ideal forms offers 
incontrovertible evidence of the dualistic foundations of the Platonic/Socratic critique, 
and irony assists Socrates in establishing the existence of such truths beyond our ken. 
Carson, however, prefers to focus on the movement and flow that a sequence of 
impersonations offers Socrates just for the sake of their own digression. Throughout her 
career, Carson has been aestheticizing figures from history, literature, and philosophy, 
and ever since Eros the Bittersweet, her first substantial published book, Socrates has 
been a favourite figure for her to aestheticize . She tends to ignore the logical and 
epistemological method that he contributes in order to focus on the "thrill" his method 
offers as a work of art. For Carson, his "feints and lesser proofs and half-burnings" are 
meant to rush the interlocutors through different errors for no other reason than the rush, 
or what at the end of Eros the Bittersweet Carson calls "the wooing itself." Just as Oscar 
Wilde, in The Decay of Lying, narrates art as a kind of lying, so Carson wants to see 
Socrates as an erring impersonator, flitting across a surface of different positions, rather 
than as the too-clever ironist philosophy has made him. 
Needless to say, this position is neither popular nor strictly correct. Gregory 
Vlastos, an important contemporary commentator on Socratic philosophy, describes irony 
as a brilliant device of concealment by which a student is tricked into epiphany by the 
fascination of the performance (Vlastos 42). Vlastos is particularly concerned with the 
status of the words eironeuomenos and eironikos as they appear in the context of the 
4
 "To reach for something else than the facts will carry you beyond this city [of no desire] 
and perhaps, as for Sokrates, beyond this world. It is a high-risk proposition, as Sokrates 
saw quite clearly, to reach for the difference between known and unknown. He thought 
the risk worthwhile, because he was in love with the wooing itself. And who is not?" 
{Eros 173) 
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pederastic relationship between Socrates and the youth Alcibiades, narrated in the 
Symposium of Xenophon. Should the words be translated as "irony" or as "deceit"? 
"Shamming" or "trickery"? The relationship between Socrates and Alcibiades doubtless 
serves as the model for the one between Deneuve and the girl in "Irony is Not Enough," 
for Socrates refuses the advances of Alcibiades in the following way: 
Socrates would have had ample opportunity to explain that Alcibiades was 
making a fool of himself, duped by his own wishful thinking. Yet Socrates said 
nothing. Day after day he watched and kept still. Why so? The only reasonable 
answer is that he wanted Alcibiades to find out the truth for himself by himself. 
The irony in his love for Alcibiades, riddling from the start, persisted until the boy 
found the answer the hard way, in a long night of anguished humiliation, naked 
next to Socrates, and Socrates a block of ice. (Vlastos 42) 
For the student of Socrates, there is no separating knowledge out of the body. The 
teacher's body stimulates and directs the student's attention, an effect that Socrates 
suspects profoundly. "Humiliation" results. In this account, error will only ever belong on 
the side of the student, whom Socrates keeps at arm's length by a mechanism that allows 
him to equivocate about his feelings and to resist entering any kind of commitment, short 
or long term, intellectual or erotic. Socrates is left outside the shame of error, protected 
by his veil of irony, superior to the student and, as Kierkegaard would say, "negatively 
free." The student, on the other hand, is left flailing, thwarted, and wrong. His attention 
moves instinctively toward what Jane Gallop called "the personal": he believes that by 
gaining intimate access to the Socratic body ultimate knowledge would be revealed. 
Carson, were she translating eironuomenos, might render it as "impersonating," or even 
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as "erring," for Socrates in her account is not a "block of ice" but someone constantly 
changing the terms of a conversation in order to keep attention strong. 
Carson's proposal is, in effect, to rewrite the non-affair between Alcibiades and 
Socrates from the perspective of the pedagogue resisting the student's advances or her 
own desire. In Carson, however, the resistance is not achieved by irony (which suggests 
but defers stable truths) but by the movement of impersonation. In the second draft of 
"Irony is Not Enough," the following passage effectively illustrates the alternative way of 
looking at Socratic effects. Indeed, Carson renders the name as "Sokrates," suggesting an 
alternative yet also more authentic version of the figure (for in Greek the name would be 
spelled with a kappa). 
Deneuve sits in her office looking at the word irony on a page. Half-burnt. You 
have to wonder. Sappho, Sokrates, is it all mental? These people seem bathed in 
goodness, yet here come the beautiful dangerous white rapids beating onto them. 
Knife of boy. Knife of girl. Knife of the little knower. Where is the ironic work 
that picks threads back from that surface into another design underneath, holding 
rapids in place? Evening fills the room. Deneuve buttons her coat and closes the 
office door behind her. Staircase is dim and filthy, small dirty deposits on each 
step. She heads for the Metro. What would Sokrates say. Name the parts. Define 
each name. Deneuve is turning names and parts over in her mind when she 
realizes she has ridden the train four stops in the wrong direction. (Men 120) 
The startling question at the centre of this passage ("where is the ironic work") loudly 
announces the stakes of Carson's whole essay. How can irony guarantee a secure and 
stable virtue for the educator, undefined by the "little knower's" insistence on the primacy 
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of bodily presence and affective arousal? Of course, in paraphrasing the question as such 
we exclude the imagery it employs to pose itself: the question in essence places two kinds 
of substance (indeed, two states of matter) in opposition. Socratic irony is the 
reconfiguration of a moving, transitional surface ("pick threads back from that surface") 
into a tightly-woven, crafted and constant image ("into another design underneath"), 
which will stabilize the force of desire that the "little knower" projects ("holding rapids in 
place"). This approach maintains a solid presence at its centre, a source uncorrupted by 
movement. The physical presence of students, by contrast, is figured as rapids, "the 
beautiful dangerous white rapids" that threaten to dissolve and corrupt the distance that 
educators like Socrates strive to maintain. The very word "rapids" denotes kinetic force, 
something that cannot be held in place, as the question suggests. The force of the student 
pulls teachers off-course, away from the solidity of the lectern5. 
This particular paragraph is titled "Parts," for it is the Socratic procedure of 
naming and defining parts that is under observation ("Name the parts. Define each 
name"). Deneuve begins with Socratic conventions of elenchus but ends up riding "the 
train four stops in the wrong direction." Error interrupts the procedure. The error is a 
deviation from a system designed to carry the subject toward a preset destination. It 
occurs on a metro car, a transitional location, a prepositional relation between fixed 
points. Naming and defining the parts, a taxonomic practice central to the maintenance of 
5
 "I think about it [teaching] as risk. As getting people to risk something. I used to think 
of it as a tightrope set up in a classroom where the teacher goes up on one end and tries to 
induce one or more of the students to come up on their end. And just sort of dance around 
for a while up there...and sometimes it works. Most of the time not. I do think it's about 
risk for the teacher even more than the students. I mean to risk leaving the ground. 
Leaving what you already have thought out and doing something else in that space" ("In 
Conversation" 5). 
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sophrosyne, yields a fruitless result. The names and the parts melt into each other, 
overtaken by what connects them, like Aristotle's nouns in Derrida's account of 
catachresis surpassed by the prepositions that fall between. Errancy emerges as Deneuve 
loses herself in these transitions—she is going in the wrong direction, no direction. Thus, 
on the one hand, we have relations replacing fixed points, and on the other hand we have 
attention to those relations leading to errancy. Instead of a procession toward tight 
categorical truths, we have a wayward flux of adjustments that refer to the changing 
conditions and relations at hand in the present. "The world is like champagne," Deneuve 
thinks as she encounters the girl, it 
crosses her mind 
as they circle 
one another in the doorway in a wash of light. (37) 
Socrates wants to hold the pattern together, wants to be "a block of ice," as Vlastos puts 
it. Carson wants champagne. 
"Irony is Not Enough" presents a problem within education diagnosed by feminist 
and queer theorists of pedagogy: the presence of bodies, both the teacher's and the 
student's. Socrates suspects Ion's pedagogy because of its near-total emphasis on the 
affective exchanges that occur between text, rhapsode, and audience, exchanges mediated 
by surface presentations and the immediacy of contact. In her piece, Carson demonstrates 
how thinking of the pedagogical relation in terms of surface distraction and 
impersonation may assist in keeping attention strong, that what we generally think of as 
an error (Alcibiabes' overvaluation of the Socratic body, for instance, or any student's 
overvaluation of their professor's "personal life") may in fact engender vital ways of 
learning about the humanities, about how the canons take on a force in the individual 
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lives of academics. We should not underrate the advantages of this kind of attention. In 
order to raise the stakes of my argument for the value of these kinds of effects, I would 
like to position Carson's filmic essay alongside two films that directly thematize aesthetic 
education as modeled by women teachers. The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie (1969) and 
Notes on a Scandal (2006) both dramatize the anxieties associated with a kind of teaching 
that emphasizes the teacher's personal claim on student attention. 
CONTROL: THE PRIME OF MISS JEAN BRODIE AND NOTES ON A SCANDAL 
"Give me a girl at an impressionable age and she is mine for life." So Jean Brodie 
announces her pedagogical motivation. In each film a young, attractive teacher is 
admonished for crossing professional boundaries, for involving bodies, movement, and 
distraction in their projects of aesthetic education in a way that their academic 
institutions, defined by middle-class mores, cannot allow. Jean Brodie and Sheba Hart 
(from Notes on a Scandal) are both "women of culture" who would like to elevate their 
students' tastes and aesthetic preferences, but their unorthodox methods conflict with the 
system of values of each woman's workplace. Both attempt an attached, performative, 
personally invested teaching method that raises eyebrows among the faculty at each 
school. I want to say that both of these films are about the anxieties associated with the 
mobilization of student attention toward the pedagogical performance itself, a situation 
where aesthetic operations such as impersonation and inspiration come to be coded as 
inadmissible infractions on the safety and welfare of the students. In many ways these 
films typify what Jane Gallop sees as the "knotted, thorny, troubling question" of "the 
personal" in feminist pedagogy, which struggles to legitimate personal contributions even 
as the inclusion of such material frustrates the equally important feminist demand for a 
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sanitized professionalism (Gallop 23). Is there a way of imagining or conceiving of an 
aestheticized, personalized education without succumbing to the anxieties over sexuality 
or politics that these films foreground? Do such anxieties in fact diagnose (or even 
enable) potentially valuable dynamics and models of relationality? 
Jean Brodie teaches at Marcia Blaine School for Girls, a conservative 
Edinbourough academy for young ladies. Jean, however, is something of a pariah among 
the faculty. Rather than teaching the girls about the specific facts or figures of history, 
she relates thrilling anecdotes of her recent Italian tour and romantic affairs with men. 
Personal facts and data figure into all of her teaching acts. Her method is perhaps best 
exemplified in the moment when she covers up a black-and-white poster of Stanley 
Baldwin (a prime minister of Great Britain) that reads "safety first" with a print of a 
painting by Giotto. "Safety does not come first," Jean says. "Goodness, truth, and beauty 
come first." These are recognizably Platonic ideals, which Brodie associates with the 
risks involved in somatic focus and pleasure, with aesthetic error and displays of passion. 
Like Carson, she frames the search for ideals in a manner that diverges from classical 
norms. 
Jean makes much of her "prime"—a thin euphemism for her sexual peak—that 
she claims to have devoted to her students, especially an elect group of them called the 
"Brodie girls." Jean teaches them about art, poetry, music, manners, food and sex, 
inviting the scrutiny, or perhaps the envy, of the headmistress Miss MacKay. What is her 
problem with Jean? Jean's pedagogical power ("thrilling pedagogical performer" 
resonates here) is figured as an intrusive aesthetic force that intervenes in the girls' 
development. Jean sings the praises of Mussolini throughout the film, and as such comes 
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to be figured as a version of a fascist, seeking to replicate herself in the behaviours and 
tastes of her students. This aesthetic force, impelling assent, causes errors of 
impersonation, made vivid when Lloyd, the art teacher, begins to paint portraits of the 
Brodie girls. The features of Jean's face inevitably intrude upon the portraits: they all end 
up looking just like her. The mark of her influence made visible in an art object 
foregrounds the aesthetic content and method of Jean's pedagogy, and also makes clear 
that impersonation may function as an error of control, both on the part of the 
impersonator and the one gazing on. This becomes intolerable to Miss Mackay and 
Sandy, one of the Brodie set 
Ultimately, it is Jean's approval of fascism, not her eccentric teaching style, 
which enables the headmistress and Sandy to "assassinate" her. The circuit of imitation 
between teacher and student is unmediated, direct, infectious, and functions in the 
manner of the magnetic chain of power that passes through different subjects in the Ion. 
As such, the system of the transmission—just how it is that Jean manages to illicit the 
devotion of her students—is impossible to codify, calculate, or administrate. In other 
words, it is a technique impossible for Miss MacKay to fix or stabilize, even to name or 
define clearly and directly. It takes its power from spontaneity and movement. While 
eating and enjoying fine food on the school grounds, for example, Jean recites poetry 
from memory, speaks extemporaneously on a variety of liberal subjects, and encourages 
the girls to do cartwheels for "comic relief." Thus the headmistress's attack on Jean is 
only effective when directed at right-wing politics, which are readily accusable in the 
1930s when the film is set, and not at aesthetics or sexuality. Still, Jean's chain of 
influence proceeds along a channel that the film conceives as simultaneously sexual and 
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aesthetic. The conjunction of the two concepts is made vivid when Jean, foretelling the 
futures of her girls one after the other, comes to Jenny, the "pretty one." Jean describes 
Jenny's future while they picnic on the lawn: "I think perhaps someday Jenny will catch 
the eye of an artist. Jenny will be painted many times. In years to come, I think that Jenny 
will be famous for sex" (fig. 1). 
Figure 1 
The short monologue begins with a close-up on Jean, flanked by Mr. Lowther (the 
music teacher, Jean's sometime lover) on the left. A slow fade to the next shot—Jenny 
modeling for Mr. Lloyd (also Jean's sometime lover)—allows Jean's face and Jenny's 
face to be superimposed momentarily. Jenny's face intercepts Mr. Lowther's gaze, which 
was directed at Jean. Just before Jean says "sex" the fade is complete. This last word, 
hovering over Jenny, intrudes upon and introduces the next scene at Mr. Lloyd's studio. 
This strange moment in the film illustrates the simultaneous transmission of both sex, 
aesthetic power, and socialization, further underscored when Lloyd's painting of Jenny 
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unintentionally resembles Jean. It's important to understand that the film represents the 
error of impersonation as an instance of too much control on the part of the teacher in this 
relation: the students are overcome by the overriding presence of Jean's body and its 
embodiment of the values, tastes, and culture she means to transmit. However, she exerts 
control through a more diffuse mechanism than her body alone, as the contaminated 
portraits of the girls make clear. Jean's power is general and takes its power from an 
educational philosophy based on a way of being in the world, not only from the canonical 
aesthetic items whose value she wishes to transmit (the paintings of Giotto, La Traviata, 
Hedda Gabler, "The Lady of Shallot," to name a few). Thus, the film aligns errors of 
impersonation with a general, "aesthetic" education, accounting for all aspects of culture 
from food choices to acrobatics. The rapid movement of the students' attention between 
the teacher and the material taught is presented as an influence that corrupts the virtue of 
the young, undermining the middle-class values of Edinburgh and leading to Italian 
fascism. 
Notes on a Scandal, a much simpler film, expresses the opposite anxiety, of a 
teacher who relinquishes all mastery to a student. There are three main characters. Sheba, 
the teacher in question, a beautiful bourgeois bohemian, a "wispy novice" who has just 
begun teaching art at an inner-city high school in the United Kingdom. She is hired, the 
headmaster tells the other teachers, because the arts are an essential part of a policy of 
"reform through nurture." Here we can see the historical difference between the films. 
While Marcia Blaine School for Girls promoted safety through conservative, restrictive 
methods, St. George's claims to promote a safe space of nurture and proximity between 
faculty and students. The film differs further from The Prime of Miss Jean Brodie in the 
Reader 57 
portrayal of its main character as well. While Jean was more than qualified to provide an 
aesthetic education for her students, capable of controlling the impersonations of her 
students, Sheba is simply a terrible art teacher. She cannot command the attention of her 
students at all, nor can she control their capacity to impersonate. 
Sheba's lover is Steven, a fifteen year-old boy, thuggish and manipulative. Sheba, 
instructed by the other jaded teachers to "find a gem," discovers Stephen's chance talent 
for drawing when he brings sketches of her face to school. She fosters his talent after 
hours in private lessons, where the affair begins, only to be discovered eventually by 
Barbara, the elder history teacher, whom we might think of as a new incarnation of Miss 
Mackay. Margaret unreliably narrates the entire film and turns it to her own sexual 
advantage (she is obsessed with Sheba). Sheba's transgression, however, lies in her being 
flattered by Steven's drawings, by conforming to the image of her that he produces and 
insists upon. This is distinctly rendered in the scene where the first physical contact 
occurs between Sheba and Steven. Alone in the art classroom reviewing Steven's 
sketches of a hand, Sheba's own hand hovers over the pages. In one swift movement, 
Sheba points to one drawing, complimenting it (fig. 2). Just as he says "yeah - 1 nailed 
it," Sheba sweeps the same hand through his hair, a gesture that marks the beginning of 
her loss of control, which culminates in her seduction (fig 3). 
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Figure 2 
The quick pan up leaves Sheba's head out of the frame, and all we see is her hand 
hovering over Steven's drawings of a hand and then touching the student in an absent-
minded but suggestive way. It suggests, in a simple sense, that Steven's seduction has 
been successful ("I nailed it") but, more complexly, that the catalyzing gesture that led to 
Sheba's error—a momentary lack of control in which she touched a student 
inappropriately—involved the appreciation of an aesthetic representation with the very 
object represented (a hand in each case) which then spurred the first professional error 
perpetrated, again, with the actual hand. In this case, watching the film, our own attention 
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moves rapidly between a representation and an object represented in one and the same 
movement. The proximity of these two things (a hand mimetically rendered and an actual 
hand) creates a surplus of potential energy that can only be released through touching. 
Yet the touch actually stops the energetic movement of attention created by the 
juxtaposition—all that matters to Stephen now is the "real" body of the teacher and 
possessing it sexually ("do you suck, Miss?" he asks). 
Notes on a Scandal presents the fears involved with a policy of "reform through 
nurture," a pedagogy that places value on relations of intimacy and in which the aesthetic 
plays a major role. In many ways, you can read Notes on a Scandal as a story that 
expresses the most extreme and obvious fear about a feminist pedagogy, what Jane 
Gallop, in "The Teacher's Breasts" calls a pedagogy "primarily concerned not with 
feminist curriculum, but with classroom dynamics and teacher-student relations" (24). 
The fear is, obviously, that such a model can only lead to students seducing their teachers 
and seizing control of the relationships, or vice versa. Both women teachers in Notes on a 
Scandal end up being persecuted one way or another: Sheba, with her "trendy politics," 
for sleeping with a student, and Barbara, whose icy exterior can only be a cover for latent 
homosexual desires that must also go unrealized. The film makes clear that teachers like 
Sheba, who practice an aestheticized, nurturing education, can only end up having sex 
with their students, while conservative, "three-Rs" teachers like Barbara, who regard their 
students cynically as the great unwashed, are only trying to suppress desire with an ironic 
and bitter facade. However, as I suggested earlier, Notes on a Scandal represents the lack 
of aesthetic education as a failure in the system that leads to a simplistic eroticization of 
teacher-student relationships. Sheba is unqualified to do the work she feels needs to be 
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done. Jean Brodie, by contrast, was decidedly overqualified. Taken together, the films 
polemically illustrate the anxieties our culture exhibits over an institutionalized "policy of 
nurture." In the case of Jean Brodie, the fear is that such a policy can only lead to 
ideological brainwashing when the strength of the pedagogue is at its height. In Sheba's 
case, the fear is that weaker teachers placed in the powerful nurturing position will end up 
being taken over by the hormones of youth. 
GENERAL ERRORS: CARSON'S PROPOSAL 
Carson's piece sketches these anxieties as well. The touch that occurred between 
Sheba and Stephen also arises as a possibility between Deneuve and the girl: 
Perhaps she would brush 
as if by accident 
her backbone. When (later) she is seated in her professor's chair 
surrounded by seminar students 
listening to her expound 
Solonian monetary reform, this accidental brushing action 
races on her nerves 
like a bit of electricity. 
But the touch does not occur—Deneuve withholds it, as Socrates does with Alcibiades 
and as Sheba does not do with Stephen. The difference, however, between Carson and 
Socrates, what ultimately allows her to continue the intellectual movement without us 
having to accuse her of deceit or the distantiation of irony, is her simultaneous occupation 
of several roles. She embodies Sappho and Socrates insofar as she teaches their works to 
her students. This makes her own body and personal life attractive to her students, an 
attention she preserves and encourages by impersonating Deneuve. This outrageous but 
provisional act angles the relationship away from what it was in danger becoming—a 
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replication of Socrates' ironic norms, a mere repetition that Carson cannot abide. "I will 
do anything to avoid boredom. It is the task of a lifetime," she says (Short Talks 1). 
But what happens to the ideological problem? In a poem essay about teaching the 
"high humanist" canon, does Carson's work offer suggestions about the way we claim 
value for that canon? She distinguishes herself from Jean Brodie by diminishing her 
sense of mastery over the students and over classroom relations—certainly the essay does 
not lean fascistically. Her mechanism of impersonation allows distraction and errancy to 
play a role in guiding the desire and attention of the student—a desire which is 
uncontained, unpredictable, active, and fluctuating, as Carson tells us at the end of the 
first draft: 
And what feels wrong 
now, as she 
looks at it, 
is the shamelessly general nature of desire. It blows 
through the body 
like a sunset wind. 
Slant and childlike errors (for example, this girl) 
reveal themselves, 
but the immensity 
of the wind does not abate, nor our sense of bending to it 
as roots 
bend 
in the dark underground, blindly and heavily 
toward some 
smell of light 
that drops down matter—who can claim to have chosen love? (42-3) 
The narrator goes on to say of desire that "access to the human may justify it overall" and 
that "it is good to exercise the lungs from time to time," the lungs referring to the last 
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word of an Ibycus fragment which Deneuve shares with her seminar at the end of the 
term. It is the "generality" of desire that "feels wrong": the humanities in their current 
state tend to be very uncomfortable with general claims of value and universal ideals. The 
belief in a general aesthetic education equipped to assist us apparently represents its own 
kind of error, but for Carson it is a problem worth conserving, just like love becomes a 
problem worth conserving in Eros the Bittersweet for the change of self that it imposed. 
I have argued that Carson enacts the Socratic process as a string of errors, an 
errant movement, instead of treating it as an ascendant procedure reaching toward higher 
and truer ideals. As we have seen, she tends to aestheticize the Socratic pedagogical 
relation, preferring to assume roles out of a bubbly sense of play rather than a rhetorical-
philosophical strategy designed to fix truth claims. This gesture, like its Socratic 
counterpart, directs student interest toward the body and personal life of the pedagogue in 
a manner that seems unearned or fallacious, that seems to contradict the universalizing, 
abstract project of the humanities. The two films we examined allow us to illustrate and 
elaborate our culture's fears about this prospect of placing as much emphasis on the 
impersonation and presence of the pedagogical performer as on the transcendent values 
she has been hired to transmit—fears which now seem to have more to do with sexual 
shame than with educational ethics. Carson's solution is "always impersonate." What 
matters is not the perfect and complete transmission of transcendent values to the student, 
nor is it the personal claim a teacher can make on that student's attention. Carson 
emphasizes the way literary and cultural personae offer dispositions and attitudes that 
students and professors may exchange and inhabit provisionally, so that we can "keep 
attention strong." She also acknowledges that such impersonations must take into account 
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the material condition of the classroom, where students take their seats with all the 
diffuse and general attention of a theatre audience. The task is to enrich and complicate 
that attention, to keep it spinning. 
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